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THE MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
BERNARD SCHWARTZ.:

The present issue of the Law Review, devoted to a symposium on
Washington administrative law, appears to be particularly timely. For,
during the 1957 session of the Washington legislature, a bill was passed
which would have placed this state in the ranks of those jurisdictions
which have, in recent years, sought to deal by statute with the problems
posed by the modern growth of administrative law. The bill in question failed of enactment, however, since it was vetoed by the Governor
-though on grounds not relating to the ultimate merits of such legislation.1The bill which thus almost became a part of Washington administrative law in 1957 was entitled: "AN ACT Relating to procedure of
state administrative agencies and review of their determinations."'
In actuality, the scope of the bill was not as far-reaching as its title
would seem to indicate. A true Administrative Procedure Act, of the
type enacted by the Federal Congress in 1946, contains, at the very
least, provisions devoted to rule-making, adjudication and judicial
review. Last year's Washington bill dealt in detail only with administrative rule-making. This, to be sure, does not mean that it was not
of great importance. But it does indicate that, even had it been enacted
into law, it would have, at best, resolved only part of the problems
that statutes like the Federal Act were intended to meet.
As Professor Peck points out,3 Senate Bill 180, in its original form,
incorporated the substance of the first seven sections of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act. It is this which makes specially
relevant an article devoted to the Model Act in a symposium devoted
to Washington administrative law. If, as appears likely, a bill similar
* Professor of Law, New York University.

'For a discussion of the attempted legislation, see Peck, Legis. Note, 32
Rav. 181 (1957).

2S.B. 180, 1957 WASH. LEGiS. Sass.
3Supra note 1.

WASH.

L.
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to S.B. 180 should become law in the near future, it is important to
have available in this state a convenient analysis of the parent legislation from which the Washington law will, in large part, have been
derived.
BACKGROUND

The Model State Administrative Procedure Act must be considered
in light of what has well been termed the pronounced "movement
toward the enactment of general statutes containing codes of procedure
to be followed by regulatory agencies." 4 This movement has certainly
been one of the most important recent developments in our administrative law. It is a natural response to the tremendous expansion of
administrative authority that has occurred during the present century.
Many have felt, in Justice Jackson's phrase, that administrative power
was not sufficiently safeguarded and sometimes put to arbitrary and
biased use.' The movement for administrative procedure legislation
has been a result of that widespread feeling.
The most important tangible result of this movement thus far has,
without a doubt, been the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of
1946. That law, rightly heralded as marking the beginning of a new
era in American administrative law, was the culmination of a long and
vigorous campaign by the organized bar-a campaign that was so
successful in securing bipartisan support for its objectives that the
1946 Act was passed without a dissenting vote in both houses of Congress. Though the contrary may often have been asserted, the Federal
Act is far from a comprehensive code of fair administrative procedure.
Instead, it lays down the general procedural principles which are to
govern administrative exercises of rule-making and adjudicatory
authority. The fact that it is a general framework rather than a
detailed code does not, however, mean that it is not of fundamental
importance. Such importance results from three things:
(1) The Federal Act represents the first important legislative
attempt to state the essential principles of fair administrative procedure.6 Congress, in enacting the Act, mirrored the mood of discontent with the administrative process which existed among many of
those subject to administrative authority. But, as the Supreme Court
4 Heady, State Administrative Procedure Laws: An Appraisal, 12 PuB. AD. REV.
10 (1952).
5 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950).
6 It should be noted, however, that Wisconsin enacted an administrative procedure
law in 1942. Wis. STATS. §§ 227.01-21.
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aptly put it, Congress expressed its mood not merely by oratory, but
7
by legislation.
(2) This means that the principles of fair procedure laid down in
the 1946 Act are binding upon the federal administrative process as
a whole. The Act is one whose provisions control the procedures of all
the agencies whose acts affect personal or property rights. It is true
that the draftsmen of the Act relied primarily upon the best preexisting administrative practice. What is of basic importance, however,
is that the Act, by stating the essentials of such practice in statutory
form, in effect imposes the best pre-1946 procedures upon all the federal agencies.
(3) Just as significant, in assessing the impact of the Federal Act,
is the fact that the Act, in some important respects, does go beyond
even the most advanced pre-1946 procedure in any of the federal
agencies. This is particularly true, for example, with regard to the
crucial question of the administrative hearing officer which is at the
heart of our administrative procedure.
Though the attention of students of administrative law in this country has, quite naturally, been focused primarily upon the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, this does not mean that the movement
for procedural reform has been confined to the federal field. On the
contrary, the states, too, have become increasingly active. There have
been several state reports comparable to that of the celebrated United
States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.
The most notable of these has been the Benjamin Report on Administrative Adjudication in New York. The value of the Benjamin Report,
it should be noted, is not limited to New York State. It does for state
administrative law what the Attorney General's Committee Report
did for federal administrative law.'
Even more significant perhaps than studies like the Benjamin Report
has been the influence of the legal profession, whose close contact with
the administrative process gave it special cause to be disturbed at the
inadequacies of existing administrative procedures. "The credit for
the reform of administrative procedure," in the words of Chief Justice
Vanderbilt, "must be given to the practicing lawyers of the country
working through the American Bar Association. ' "9
7

Universal Camera Corp. -. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,487 (1951).

8 See Stason, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMIssIONms ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 193 (1946).
0
IN THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDuRE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 8 (1947).
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After 1937, when the American Bar Association Section on Judicial
Administration formed a Special Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals, the Bar's concern, in the state field, can be traced
in this Committee's reports. In 1938, at the American Bar Association
meeting, the Committee presented a comprehensive report on judicial
review of administrative action in the states. This report was most
favorably received, and has been termed the major impetus to constructive thinking about state administrative law."0 In 1939 the Committee reported again, accompanying its report with the draft of a
proposed Act dealing with the major phases of state administrative
procedure. This Act was prepared to serve as a model for state legislation on the subject. It was this draft statute which served as the
origin of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act."
This draft Act was referred by the American Bar Association Section to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. At the 1939 meeting of the Conference, the Act was discussed
and a Conference Committee was appointed for further study of the
draft. After the publication of the Attorney General's Committee and
Benjamin Reports, a revised draft was prepared and submitted at the
1942 session of the Conference." The matter was again submitted at
the 1943 session of the Conference, when it was decided to offer the
proposed law as a Model Act rather than as a Uniform Act. In 1944
the Model State Act was tentatively approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and, in October
1946, the Act was finally approved by the Conference.
Why was the Act promulgated as a Model Act, rather than a Uniform Act, as had originally been intended? The basic reason stems
from the very nature of administrative law. In such a field-relatively new and still in a state of flux-it is neither desirable nor feasible
to have uniformity among the several states. "There is something
to be said for allowing the continuation of the evolution of ideas rather
than the freezing of matters in the form of uniform legislation. ....
Therefore, we feel that a Uniform Act would neither be desirable nor
feasible."' 3
What are the essential procedural principles provided for in the
10 Stason, The Model State Administrative ProcedureAct, 33 IoWA L. REv. 196, 198
(1948).
11 Stason,

HANDB00K OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM

STATE LAWS 192-194 (1946).
12 This measure was enacted almost verbatim in 1942 in Wisconsin.
1 HAND00K OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAWS 83 (1943).
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Model State Administrative Procedure Act? According to the Handbook of the National Conference itself, they are the following:
1. Requirement that each agency shall adopt essential procedural
rules and that, so far as practicable, all rule-making (both procedural
and substantive) shall be accompanied by notice of hearing to interested persons;
2. Assurance of proper publicity for administrative rules that affect
the public;
3. Provision for advance determination or "declaratory judgments"
on the validity of administrative rules, and provision for "declaratory
rulings" affording advance determination of the application of administrative rules to particular cases;
4. Assurance of fundamental fairness in administrative hearings,
particularly in regard to rules of evidence and the taking of official
notice in quasi-judicial proceedings;
5. Provision assuring personal familiarity on the part of the responsible deciding officers and agency heads with the evidence in quasijudicial cases decided by them;
6. Assurance of proper scope of judicial review of administrative
orders to guarantee correction of administrative errors. 4
It will be the purpose of the remainder of this article briefly to
analyze the key provisions of the Model State Act, in order to determine how these procedural principles are given effect by them. Such
an analysis should prove of great value in a state like Washington,
where, as already stated, at least the first part of the Model Act came
so close to being enacted into law.
RULE-MAKING

The iodel State Act, like the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, is based upon the fundamental dichotomy between rule-making
and adjudication. In this it differs from Senate Bill 180, which, as
pointed out above, dealt essentially only with administrative rulemaking. It should, however, be emphasized that a law which covers
only the rule-making function is, at best, merely a truncated administrative procedure statute. Rule-making is, of course, a vital weapon
in the modern administrative armory. But adjudicatory power is at
least as important. The present-day agency both legislates and adjudicates and, if anywhere, it is in the exercise of the decision-making
power that there is the greater danger of abuse.
'1id. at 195.
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The procedural provisions of the Model State Act are thus grounded
upon the rule-making-adjudication distinction. The procedure prescribed with regard to rule-making is largely informal in nature. The
requirements imposed where administrative adjudications are concerned are more formal and, while not as detailed as those in the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, still tend, in large part, to be
modeled upon the procedure of the judicial process.
What are the requirements imposed by the Model State Act upon administrative exercises of rule-making power? The question of procedure
is, of course, of basic importance to those who are affected by such
power. The prescription of proper procedures should be one of the
basic purposes of any administrative procedure legislation. The aim
of such procedures should be to ensure some participation to those
affected in the rule-making process. The basic goal here is to democratize the rule-making process as much as can feasibly be done, without
imposing such burdensome requirements that the effective working of
the agency concerned will be unduly hampered."
How is this aim to be achieved without the danger referred to
becoming a reality? The Model State Act seeks to accomplish this
by providing for antecedent publicity before an agency engages in any
exercise of its rule-making powers. Section 2(3) of that Act provides
that, before an agency adopts, amends, or repeals a rule, it "shall so
far as practicable, publish or otherwise circulate notice of its intended
action and afford interested persons opportunity to submit data or
views orally or in writing." It should be noted that a similar provision
was contained in Senate Bill 180.
Section 4 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act also aims at
securing prior publicity before rules are published by federal agencies.
The Federal Act is, however, more detailed than the Model Act in this
respect. Thus the federal law expressly indicates how the notice of
proposed rule-making is to be given, i.e., in the Federal Register. The
lack of a publication analogous to the Register in most states makes a
similar direction in the Model Act impractical. In addition, the details
of the required notice are prescribed in the Federal Act, but left to
agency discretion in the Model Act. Yet it should be noted that details
similar to the federal statute were contained in section 3(2) of Senate
Bill 180.
Neither the procedure prescribed by section 4 of the Federal Act
25 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
PROCEDURE 225 (1941).

GENERAL'S

COMMITTEE ON

ADMINISTRATIVE
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nor that imposed by section 2(3) of the Model Act places undue burdens upon an agency's exercise of its rule-making authority. The only
real mandatory requirement in either statute is the giving of the notice
of proposed rule-making as prescribed. There is, it is true, also the
requirement that interested persons be given an opportunity to state
their views. But the details of such "opportunity" are left entirely
to the discretion of the agencies concerned. The form and extent of
the participation by persons in rule-making are entirely for the agency
to determine. Thus, it is up to it to decide whether there shall be any
public hearing procedures, and their nature, or whether those interested
shall merely be given an address to which they can send any views in
writing. Nor is there any requirement that the views of interested
persons be given any real weight. This is true even under the Federal
Act, despite its requirement that the agency act after "consideration of
all relevant matter presented." Whether an agency did or did not give
the required consideration is a matter locked within its own mental
processes-which means, in effect, that the question of what weight,
if any, is to be given to the representatives of interested persons is left
entirely to the particular federal agency.
It is interesting to note that, under Senate Bill 180, there was an
express provision to permit agencies to dispense with the requirement
of antecedent publicity if they find "that immediate adoption or amendment of a regulation is necessary for the preservation of the public
health, safety, or general welfare, and that observance of the requirements of notice and opportunity to present views on the proposed
action would be contrary to the public interest." The agency concerned
might then issue the regulation in question as an emergency regulation.
This, however, would not give the agencies as much discretion as the
relevant provision of the Federal Act. Under it, an agency can dispense
with the requirements of section 4 merely upon its finding that notice
and public procedure are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest." In addition, under Senate Bill 180, emergency
regulations could not remain in effect for longer than ninety days,
while, under the Federal Act, the agencies can dispense with the necessary procedures for as long as they choose.
It should be emphasized that neither the Federal Act nor the Model
Act requires the agency concerned to afford an oral hearing to anyone
desiring to participate in the rule-making process. This is true despite
the fact that the use of such hearings has become a common feature
of both the federal and state administrative processes. The draftsmen
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of both Acts have hesitated to provide a requirement of public hearings in connection with all exercises of the rule-making power. Such
a requirement, it has been felt, might well prove too burdensome,
and it may well be that the informal safeguard of antecedent publicity
is really as far as such statutes can practically go.
The remaining matter concerning rule-making dealt with in the
Model Act is that of publication. The desirability of prompt publication of administrative rules seems almost too obvious today to require
detailed comment. "[I]t would be intolerable if it could be said that
obscure clerks in [an agency] poured forth streams of departmental
legislation which nobody had any means of knowing. This would be
the method attributed to Caligula of writing his laws in small characters and hanging them upon high pillars 'the more effectively to ensnare
the people.' ...
As far as the federal field is concerned, there has been a system of
publication of administrative rules in effect since the enactment of the
Federal Register Act of 1935, and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act has consequently not had to deal with the basic problem.
Sections 3 and 4 of the Model Act have in view the setting up of a
similar system in the states. Section 3 provides for the filing forthwith
in the office of the Secretary of State, or other equivalent officer, of
each rule adopted by any agency. Under Section 4, the Secretary of
State is to compile, index, and publish all rules adopted by each agency
and remaining in effect. Compilation shall be supplemented or revised
as often as necessary and at least once every two years. In addition,
the Secretary of State is to publish a monthly bulletin setting forth
the text of all rules filed during the preceding month.
Senate Bill 180 in this state contained essentially these provisions
of the Model Act with regard to publication. From a practical point
of view, it may well be that these were the most important parts of
Senate Bill 180. Certainly, it is vital to practitioners and public alike
that all rules be available in convenient form, outside the pigeonholes
of the agencies themselves. Until a system of publication is provided
for, there remains a dangerous lacuna in any system of administrative law.
DECLARATORY RuLINGs

Senate Bill 180 provided expressly for the issuance by administrative agencies of declaratory rulings upon petition by any interested
parties. If stated to be binding, such rulings are binding between the
16 Carr, CO

MITTEE ON MINISTERS' PoW=Rs, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 20S

(1932).
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agency and the petitioner on the state of facts alleged, unless such
ruling is altered or set aside by a court. This provision is similar to
that contained in section 7 of the Model State Act. Its purpose is to
provide a device akin to the declaratory judgment procedure in the
courts. By the declaratory judgment procedure, it is possible to obtain
binding judicial determinations which dispose of legal controversies
without the necessity of any party acting at his peril upon his own
view. A like instrument is of equal value in the administrative field.
Advisory rulings of the type now issued by both federal and state
agencies do not, of themselves, answer the problem of the need for
predictability in the administrative process. They do, it is true, go part
of the way toward meeting the needs of private parties. "The value to
17
the public of this means of guidance in advance of action is apparent.'
It should, however, be emphasized that advisory rulings do not entirely
solve the problem, for they are not binding upon the agency issuing
them. Normally, of course, such rulings can be safely relied upon; yet
the rare case does occur where a different view is taken at a later
stage because of some change in agency personnel or policy. "Consequently advisory rulings do not entirely eliminate, though they materially reduce, the element of uncertainty. Greater certainty can be
achieved only by attaching to the ruling the same binding effect upon
the agency that is attributed to other adjudications."' 8
A general statute in this field should consequently authorize administrative agencies to issue binding declaratory rulings in appropriate
cases. The dangers of abuse which some have seen in such a procedure
can be avoided by providing for the issuance of such rulings in the
discretion of the relevant agency and by governing their issuance by
the same basic principles that govern declaratory judgments in the
courts. Such binding declaratory rulings would, of course, be subject
to judicial review, just as are ordinary administrative adjudications.
This is, in fact, what is done by both Senate Bill 180 and section 7 of
the Model State Act.
ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE

Senate Bill 180, as already stated, provided essentially the procedures which are to govern administrative rule-making. The Model
State Administrative Procedure Act is far more comprehensive, for it
also deals with adjudicatory procedure and judicial review. It is true
17

I8

Benjamin, ADmINISTRATVE ADJUDICATION IN NFW YORK 262 (1942).

FIIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADmINISTRATIVE

PR0CE UrE

31 (1941).
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that even the Model Act is less complete on these subjects than is the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Even so, the Model Act does
clearly constitute an important step in the direction of more detailed
legislative control of administrative procedure.
To be sure, to have an over-detailed prescription of procedural
requirements in an administrative procedure law like the Model Act
is neither desirable nor feasible. The provisions of such a statute
cannot go beyond stating the essentials of fair adjudicatory procedure; their detailed application must be left to the individual
agencies concerned. Such an Act should recognize that "certain fundamentals of fairness with regard to notice, pleadings and proof are as
appropriate in administrative quasi-judicial hearings as in hearings
before courts,"' 9 and should then seek to state such principles.
Notice. "Specification of the issues to be determined in a quasijudicial proceeding appropriate to the character of the particular proceeding, is one of the basic elements of fair procedure."" The giving
of adequate notice in contested cases is consequently the first point
on adjudicatory procedure with which the Model Act attempts to deal.
For the right to a hearing, however generously preserved, is of little
use unless those affected are informed beforehand of the contemplated
agency action. Section 8 of the Model Act guarantees reasonable notice
of the hearing which is to state the time, place, and issues involved.
It may be, as has been asserted, that "when the statute covers many
different types of proceedings, it is practically impossible to say any2
thing more meaningful than that adequate notice shall be given.) 1
The notice provisions of the Model Act do, however, appear to assure
to parties affected by administrative adjudications at least a minimum
specification of the issues prior to hearing.
Rules of Evidence. It is almost hornbook law today that the common-law rules of evidence are not, as such, binding upon administrative agencies in the absence of statutory provisions. This is dearly
recognized by section 9(1) of the Model State Act, under which "agencies may admit and give probative effect to evidence which possesses
probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs." As Dean Stason points out, "This is a rational
standard, considerably less rigorous than the rules of the common law
19 Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REV. 196 at
208 (1948).
20 Benjamin, ADmiNismTTv ADJUDICATION IN NEw YoRK 77 (1942).
21 Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law, 33 IoWA
L. R-v. 252, 268 (1948).
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which were designed primarily for jury trials, yet considerably short
of admitting everything that whim and fancy of counsel may offer."2 2
Exclusiveness of Record. "Where a hearing is prescribed by statute,
nothing must be taken into account by the administrative tribunal in
arriving at its determination that has not been introduced in some
manner into the record of the hearing. 2 3 This fundamental principle
of exclusiveness of the record is given statutory effect in section 9(2)
of the Model Act, which provides that, apart from evidence in the
record, "no other factual information or evidence shall be considered
in the determination of the case." A similar provision is contained in
section 7 (d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Such legislative statement of the exclusiveness of the record principle should be
useful in clarifying the law in those states which have not yet had
judicial articulations of it.
Closely related to the above is the subject of official notice. "Statutory provisions with respect to official notice, if not very carefully
worded, may have an unfortunate tendency to drive underground the
inevitable use by an administrative agency of its accumulated knowledge and experience in the evaluation of the evidence presented in the
particular case.""1 Section 9(4) of the Model State Act seeks to avoid
this tendency by encouraging the use of administrative expertise
through a provision definitely recognizing the doctrine of official notice.
It reads: "Agencies may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and
in addition may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts
within their specialized knowledge."
At the same time, it is essential that the doctrine be kept within the
bounds permitted by the principle of exclusiveness of the record. The
parties should be notified of matters officially noticed, with adequate
opportunity to contest them. Section 9(4) of the Model Act contains
an express provision to this effect, stating that "parties shall be notified
either before or during or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material so noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed." There is an analogous provision
in section 7(d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Separation of Functions. One of the principal omissions from the
Model State Act, as compared with the Federal Administrative Pro22 Stason, The Model State Administrative ProcedureAct, 33 IowA L. REv. 196 at
205 (1948).
23 Benjamin, ADMINIsTRATIVE ADJUDIcATION IN NEW YORK 206 (1942).
24 Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative

IOWA

L. REv. 252, 274 (1948).
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cedure Act, is its failure to make any attempt to deal with the problem
arising from the concentration of the functions of prosecutor and judge
in administrative agencies. "In the field of administrative jurisdiction," Chief Justice Vanderbilt has stated, "the greatest controversy
has been over the commingling of investigating, prosecuting and
judicial functions in one man or one body of men."2'5 That the concentration of functions has given rise to such controversy should occasion
little surprise. "Concern with the problem of merger of the powers
of prosecutor and judge in the same agency springs," as Justice Brennan
pointed out before his elevation to the Supreme Court, "from the fear
that the agency official adjudicating upon private rights cannot wholly
free himself from the influences toward partiality inherent in his identification with the investigative and prosecuting aspects of the case; in
other words, that the atmosphere in which he must make his judgments is not conducive to the critical detachment toward the case
expected of the judge. In a sense the combination of functions violates
the ancient tenet of Anglo-American justice that 'No man shall be a
judge in his own cause....' The litigant often feels that, in this combination of functions within a single tribunal or agency, he has lost all
opportunity to argue his case to an unbiased official and that he has
been deprived of safeguards that he has been taught to revere." 2'
The problem of concentration of functions, Justice Brennan goes
on to inform us, "can be best dealt with by legislation, as its solution
implicates considerations of administrative efficiency in effectuating
legislative policy." 7 It is clear that an effort to deal with the problem
was one of the prime purposes of the draftsmen of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. The fundamental purpose of that Act, indeed,
according to the United States Supreme Court, "was the purpose to
curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency
the duties of prosecutor and judge."2 8 The Federal Act did not go so
far as some had urged and require a complete separation of investigating and prosecuting functions from adjudicating functions." It did,
however, make an effort to provide some safeguards within the existing
framework of the agency by so-called internal separation." "That
statute embodies the theory of internal separation, leaving the func-

5Vanderbilt, THE DoCTRINE OF SEPARATION

2

OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIG-

(1953).
26 In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 86 A.2d 430 (1952) (concurring opinion).
2786 A.2d at 436.
28
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
29Id.at 46.
30 Vanderbilt, THE DoCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY
NIFICANCE 92 (1953).
NIFICANCE 90

SIG-

1958]

MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

13

tions with the agency but providing safeguards to assure their insulation from one another and to further the independence of personnel
engaged in judging."3
Some have criticized the provisions of the Federal Act on this point
on the ground that they do not go far enough. But it cannot be denied
that they do constitute a serious legislative attempt to deal with the
problem of the concentration of functions. The failure of the draftsmen of the Model State Act is to be regretted, for the problem involved
is one of the most pressing in our administrative law. "There is general
agreement that there is substance in the fear that in such concentration inheres the danger of partiality in judgments having an impact
upon private rights and that the danger cannot be ignored."3 2
Processof Decision. "In the entire quasi-judicial process, the process
of decision is of paramount importance."3 3 In the case of some administrative decisions, it is the agency itself (meaning the agency head or
heads) which hears the evidence and makes the decision. The process
of decision in such cases is similar to that in the judicial process and
serious problems do not arise. It is where, as in most cases, the hearing
is held before a subordinate officer, with the actual power of decision
vested elsewhere in the agency, that difficulties may arise. This type
of procedure, with the hearing before one officer and the decision by
another, is today well established in the administrative field.
The primary question that arises where the hearing is conducted by
one officer with the actual decision being made elsewhere in the
agency is that of "how the officer (or body) who makes the decision is
to acquaint himself with the evidence and arguments of the parties."'"
That the "one who decides must hear" principle of the first Morgan
case, taken literally, is inadequate as an answer seems obvious when
one considers the great volume and complexity of the matters dealt
with by many modern agencies. The agency head, whether a single
individual or board, could not possibly dispose of them unaided in the
sense in which a court judges the cases which come before it. The
device used in most cases, as has been indicated, is for the administrative hearing to be conducted by subordinate officers, with the process
of decision taking place elsewhere in the agency. This device, however,
when carried to the extent it often is, may cause private parties to
lose faith in the justice of administrative proceedings, for if the hearing
31 In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 86 A.2d 430 at 436 (1952)
32 Ibid.

(concurring opinion).

33 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN NEW YoRK 221 (1942).
84 Id. at 225.
:5 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
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officer "becomes divorced from responsibility for decision two undesirable consequences ensue: the hearing itself degenerates and the decision becomes anonymous.136 That the vicarious process of decision
prevalent in the administrative field is not conducive to public confidence is shown by the many criticisms which have been directed
against it.
Section 10 of the Model Act seeks to deal with this problem, at least
in part. It provides that whenever, in a contested case, a majority of
the agency officials who are to render the final decision have not heard
or read the evidence, no decision adverse to the private party shall be
made until a proposed decision, including findings and conclusions,
has been served on the parties and an opportunity given them to argue
thereon before a majority of the officials who are to render the decision.
Such officials are personally to consider such portions of the record as
are cited by the parties.
This is certainly a step forward, especially in the express requirement of familiarity on the part of the deciding officers with the
pertinent parts of the record. One wonders, however, whether that
requirement is any more enforceable in practice than the rule of the
first Morgan case. The Federal Act follows a different approach. It
tries to resolve the problem of the institutional decision by assimilating
the roles of hearing and deciding officials within the agency to those
of trial and appellate courts. Under section 8 (a), the hearing examiner
is given the power to make an initial decision, which, unless appealed
from or reviewed, becomes the decision of the agency. Possible
impairment of administrative efficiency is avoided by allowing the
agency to require (in specific cases or by general rule) that the record
be certified to it for initial decision. In the latter case, the examiner
must first make a recommended decision.
It should be noted that the process of decision prescribed in the
Federal Act depends, for its effectiveness, upon the existence of the
corps of qualified hearing examiners provided for in section 11. It
may well be that the failure of section 10 of the Model State Act to
go as far as section 8 of the Federal Act results from the absence of
provision in it for a similar system of examiners.
JUDIcIAL REvEW

Aside from provision for review by declaratory judgment of the
validity of agency rules, Senate Bill 180 did not deal with the all36
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important subject of judicial review of administrative action. This
subject is dealt with in some detail in section 12 of the Model Act.
In the first place, the Model Act takes the important step of doing
away with the forms of action in administrative law and substituting
in their place a single review action. This appears to be the aim of
section 12(2) of the Act. It provides for review proceedings to be
instituted by a simple petition filed in the court of general jurisdiction.
The Federal Act, it should be noted, does not go so far, for, in section
10(b), there "is an express statutory recognition of the so-called common-law actions as being appropriate and authorized means of judicial
7
review.M
The provisions of the Model Act, with regard to the availability of
review, aside from the matter of forms of action, appear, more or less,
to restate existing law. "Any person," reads section 12(1) of the Act,
"aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether such decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." In this language, there is a legislative restatement of the
principle of Stark v. Wickard3 that review is available even in the
absence of other express statutory provision therefor, of the requirment of "standing" on the part of the person seeking review, and of
the requirement of ripeness for review, as modified by the rejection of
the so-called "negative order" doctrine in the celebrated Rochester
Telephone case." Section 10(a) of the Federal Act, whose language
is analogous, appears to have a similar effect.
Until relatively recently, the question of the proper scope of review
was one of the most hotly contested questions in our administrative
law. In the federal field, as is well known, prior to the Administrative
Procedure Act, the scope of review had been progressively narrowed
by the courts. It was dissatisfaction with the restricted scope of
review in the federal field, as much as anything else, which gave
impetus to the movement which resulted in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Yet, although the scope of review of federal
administrative action has clearly been somewhat broadened by section
10(e) of that statute, it would still seem to be, on the whole, a restricted
one. The Federal Act expressly re-enacts the substantial evidence rule
which had previously governed the scope of review in the federal
courts.: 0 Nor does it have any effect upon the restricted review avail212 (1944-1946).
38 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
89 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
40 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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able in the federal field over so-called mixed questions of law and
41
fact.
The Model State Act appears to go somewhat further than the Federal Act in broadening the scope of review. Under section 12(7), the
reviewing court is expressly given the authority to review administrative decisions as to "inferences" and "conclusions" as well as "findings." In the federal cases there has been some question as to the
existence of this power.4 ' Aside from this, however, the Model Act, in
its effect, is like the Federal Act. The substantial evidence rule is
widened so that administrative decisions may be reviewed or modified
if they are "unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted." The direction to the
court here to review "the entire record" is not unlike that with regard
to "the whole record" contained at the end of section 10(e) of the
Federal Act. The requirement that the agency decision be supported
by evidence which is "competent" and "material" as well as "substantial" is, it is true, not present in the judicial review section of the
federal statute. It is interesting to note that such a provision was contained in that section in the form in which the bill was originally presented to Congress. The references to competency and materiality
were, however, deleted by the Senate Judiciary Committee. No reason
was given for the deletion. As explained by Dean Stason, "the addition
of the word 'competent' will require that under the Model Act there
shall be at least a little legally competent evidence to support each
finding of essential fact." 3 Hence, it appears to state the so-called
"legal residuum" rule in legislative form. Under that rule, first enunciated by the New York Court of Appeals,4 4 an administrative decision
cannot rest solely upon incompetent evidence, such as hearsay. Instead
there must be somewhere in the record at least a residuum of legal
evidence to support the decision, else it must be set aside. To many
students of the subject, this is a needed check upon the agency power
to admit any evidence it chooses, unhampered by the courtroom rules.

41
42

See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951)).
See Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REv. 196,

208 (1948).

43 Ibid.
44 Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).

